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Book Review
Anne C. Dailey, Law and the Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Perspective, New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2017, pp. 304, $15.50
Reviewed by Susan Carle
Anne C. Dailey’s beautifully conceived and written book Law and the 
Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Perspective1 makes a strong case that the insights of the 
psychoanalytic tradition remain important to law, even these many decades 
after the initial era of excitement about this topic.2 Psychoanalytic insights 
point to humans’ complex psychological makeup. Their appreciation thus, 
according to Dailey, can infuse law with humanistic qualities such as the 
capacities for forgiveness, redemption, mercy, empathy, and tolerance.3 Yet, 
as Dailey acknowledges in the book’s last chapter, some of what appears 
most relevant about psychology to law today comes from its natural science-
based subfields, such as cognitive neuroscience, rather than its humanistic 
strands, such as psychoanalysis. In Part I of this review, I lay out Dailey’s main 
arguments about how psychoanalysis can improve law. In Part II, I assess 
these arguments in relation to the natural science-based thinking of cognitive 
psychology disciplines, such as neuroscience and behavioral economics, which 
have gained great popularity with legal scholars today. 
Having spent a year’s sabbatical teaching myself about social neuroscience4 
after a long-ago undergraduate education immersed in Freud and other classic 
1. Anne C. DAiley, lAw AnD the UnConsCioUs: A PsyChoAnAlytiC PersPeCtive (2017). 
2. Dailey dates the heyday of this era as 1967, the year in which Jay Katz, Joseph Goldstein, 
and Alan Dershowitz published Psychiatry and Law. See id. at 1. Yet, as she further points out, 
the intellectual history of legal scholars’ examination of the influence of the concept of 
the unconscious on legal theory goes back at least to oliver wenDell holmes, Jr., the 
Common lAw (1881), and extends to other “towering” twentieth-century jurists including 
Cardozo, Frank, and Frankfurter. DAiley, supra note 1, at 42, 61. 
3. Id. at 10.
4. Social neuroscience is a relatively new interdisciplinary field that draws from a multitude of 
experimental and medical methodologies to study how the brain performs social behavior. 
See generally Tor D. Wager & Martin A. Lindquist, Essentials of Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging, in the oxforD hAnDbook of soCiAl neUrosCienCe 69 (Jean Decety & John T. 
Cacioppo eds., 2011) [hereinafter soCiAl neUrosCienCe hAnDbook]; John T. Cacioppo 
& Jean Decety, An Introduction to Social Neuroscience, in soCiAl neUrosCienCe hAnDbook at 3, 
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social theorists, I must admit that I started Dailey’s book somewhat skeptically. 
As I read, I realized that I regard Freudian theory as a relic of an intellectual 
tradition now superseded by the different intellectual fashions of a new century. 
I was soon won over, however, by Dailey’s humble yet brilliantly insightful 
prose. Dailey’s humility and sincerity charmed me; her unassuming yet on-
point argument style led me to lower my guard. Her sensible observations 
returned me to commitments I held in my intellectual youth but have become 
too cynical to remember anymore. In this respect, Dailey’s prose functions 
somewhat as therapy does—opening memory to beliefs held in an earlier, more 
optimistic state of mind. Dailey’s book thus provides a kind of therapy via 
the written page for a world that has become too bitter to pay regard to the 
humanistic virtues anymore. 
Psychoanalysis in Law as Humanism 
Dailey’s most fundamental point is that a psychoanalytic perspective 
can teach law the virtue of humility in judging human motivation and 
conduct. Psychoanalysis calls for greater compassion for wrongdoers and 
greater appreciation for the fact that adjudicators can never truly determine 
human intent.5 As Dailey puts it, the insights she draws from her reading of 
the psychoanalytic tradition “move law in the direction of a more skeptical, 
less epistemologically certain, and more forgiving model of judging.”6 Note 
here that Dailey’s focus is on a certain type of psychoanalysis influenced by 
feminist and other philosophical traditions that emphasize the limits of human 
knowing. Certainly, not all famous psychoanalysts, with Freud being Exhibit 
One, were known for “humility” in either their ideas or practices.7 
Dailey argues that psychoanalysis can provide enriching insights about 
the obvious fact that we often do not behave rationally. Law typically wants 
to assume, contrary to observed evidence, that we do, but psychoanalysis 
shows that we access only some of our thoughts, and that needs and desires 
we only partly understand motivate us. The emotions that influence us arise 
from our first experiences in life as creatures dependent on highly imperfect 
caregivers.8 The task of applying such psychoanalytic insights to law does not 
involve condemning law as hopelessly out of sync with human nature, Dailey 
argues, but achieving a better balance between “serving the law’s pragmatic 
5 (noting that “[s]ocial neuroscience emerged in the early 1990s as a new interdisciplinary 
academic field”); Svenja Matusall et al., The Emergence of Social Neuroscience as an Academic 
Discipline, in soCiAl neUrosCienCe hAnDbook at 6, 9, 12, 17-18 (discussing the contribution 
to social neuroscience of brain neuroimaging studies, behavioral economics, game theory, 
computer modeling, epidemiology, animal behavior studies, and experimental social and 
developmental psychology). 
5. DAiley, supra note 1, at 98. 
6. Id. at 18. 
7. For a recent unflattering portrayal of Freud’s temperament and character, see freDeriCk 
Crews, freUD: the mAking of An illUsion (2017). 
8. DAiley, supra note 1, at 6-7.
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need to govern and hold individuals accountable,” on the one hand, and “the 
importance of taking into account unconscious influences on decision-making 
and behavior,” on the other.9
Dailey applies these insights to a range of legal topics, including family law, 
criminal law, juvenile law, and what she terms the law of “sexual choice,” by 
which she mostly means sexual autonomy.10 A presumption of rational human 
behavior generally works well enough in fields such as commercial law, Dailey 
asserts (although some would probably contest even that proposition), but such 
a presumption works much less well in areas such as criminal interrogations 
and contracts between close family members.11 The stronger the emotions and 
deep human attachments in play, Dailey suggests, the less well the rational-
actor paradigm can be presumed to work. 
As a legal scholar who has struggled with applying the broad principles of 
interdisciplinary thinking to the nitty-gritty doctrinal details of law, I know 
how difficult this project can be. Dailey excels at the task. To be clear, she does 
not argue that psychoanalysis should be used in particular cases to achieve 
certain results. Dailey is looking at broad principles instead, a point that is 
important to emphasize at the start, because people so often regard psychology 
as relevant to law primarily as a tool in litigation. As Freud pointed out, and as 
Dailey agrees, the potential contributions of the psychological disciplines to 
law lie in shaping legal doctrine and policy generally, not in specific applications 
in particular cases. 12 
Turning to how psychoanalysis can influence legal doctrine and policy, 
Dailey starts with criminal interrogations. She points out the huge mismatch 
between the legal assumption that confessions are, in the words of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, “the most probative and damaging evidence” that can be used 
against a defendant,13 and the actual evidence on this score, which documents 
a human tendency to agree to false statements when faced with interrogation.14 
Accordingly, Dailey argues, courts should be far more careful to evaluate 
confessions for possible coercion and other signs of unreliability.15 To support 
this recommendation, she focuses on several interrogation techniques, 
9. Id. at 226. 
10. She also point outs, without further developing this point, that these insights can be applied 
to many more areas of legal doctrine, including sexual harassment, the death penalty, trusts 
and estates, employment, discrimination, property, and obscenity law. Id. at 226. For more 
on Dailey’s use of the term “sexual choice,” see Anne C. Dailey, The Psychodynamics of Sexual 
Choice, 57 Ariz. l. rev. 343, 343 (2015) (equating sexual choice with sexual autonomy). 
11. DAiley, supra note 1, at 21. 
12. Id. at 44 (“Freud argued that psychoanalysis was not suitable in the courtroom”). 
13. Id. at 103, 249 n.1 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991)) (citations 
omitted). 
14. Id. at 105. 
15. Id. at 126. 
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including false sympathy, degradation, and trickery, and discusses how each 
works psychologically to produce false confessions.16 For example, in cases in 
which interrogators have produced a confession by building a relationship 
with a defendant based on false expressions of sympathy and emotional 
support, such tactics can wear down a defendant’s powers of resistance to 
the point that a confession becomes coerced.17 Likewise, where interrogators 
resort to tactics emphasizing the defendant’s lack of worth, such “degrading 
police tactics can inflame self-destructive urges” and thus “violate the Due 
Process Clause test of voluntariness.”18 And in cases of trickery, defendants 
may begin to doubt their own minds, even about facts that are patently not 
true. This doubt can lead to “unconscious guilt about some other perceived 
transgression,” causing defendants to wrongly confess because they have come 
to believe that false evidence must be true.19 Thus, Dailey concludes, the fact 
that a subject has been read his or her Miranda rights20 “should not be the 
final word on the admission of confessions”; instead, courts should subject 
confessions to close Due Process Clause scrutiny.21 Of course, due-process 
challenges to confessions are as old as the concept of due process itself; what 
Dailey seeks to offer are the most up-to-date psychological insights that can 
support such challenges. 
Dailey next turns to what she terms intimate contracts.22 She begins with 
prenuptial agreements. Given the frequency with which people enter into such 
agreements, which are clearly against their economic self-interest, something 
other than rational behavior clearly must be taking place. Yet, Dailey observes, 
courts seem to ignore this obvious fact.23 Such agreements fall squarely into 
the realm of human affairs in which the psychoanalytic tradition points 
to powerful, unconscious forces being at play. Dailey acknowledges that 
cognitive psychology, which has documented humans’ tendency to make 
overly optimistic predictions, explains in part why persons would enter into 
prenuptial contracts that are against their clear economic interests. Yet she 
argues that psychoanalytic concepts can further enrich explanations for 
this phenomenon. Unconscious ambivalence may be another factor, under 
which persons may split off negative feelings from positive ones and allow 
only positive emotions toward another to enter conscious perception.24 A 
prospective spouse thus may be making a cognitive error not as the result of 
16. Id. at 105-26.
17. Id. at 112. 
18. Id. at 118. 
19. Id. at 125. 
20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
21. DAiley, supra note 1, at 105. 
22. Id. at 128.
23. Id. at 132. 
24. Id. at 135-36. 
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a faulty computational shortcut, but because she is dynamically suppressing 
information that would be obvious to a disinterested outsider. Similarly, 
Dailey quips, “it is not surprising that the legal system engages in its own 
form of denial by simply ignoring this psychic drama altogether and strictly 
enforcing the contract.”25 
Thus, Dailey concludes, prenuptial agreements, being closely bound with 
love and attachment and irrational optimism colored by desire and hope, 
deserve much closer scrutiny by courts than they typically get. She offers 
several practical suggestions about how legal rules for enforcing prenuptial 
agreements could be improved, including by requiring judicial review before 
contracts are enforced, limiting lawful prenuptial agreements to “a few model 
contracts already vetted for general fairness,” and applying the doctrine of 
unconscionability to test whether such contracts were “fair and reasonable” 
when signed.26 
Dailey’s arguments focus on the weaker party in the relationship. What 
she does not discuss, but perhaps should, is whether analysis of prenuptial 
agreements should also consider unconscious influences the stronger party may 
be experiencing. This is true throughout the book: Dailey is most concerned 
with those with relatively little power within the legal system. This may be 
because she views more powerful parties as having an easier time realizing 
their interests and desires through law, and for this reason is most concerned 
about how unconscious factors may thwart the interests of weaker parties in the 
law. Nonetheless, a subsequent investigation focused on how psychoanalytic 
insights could help illuminate potential reform of the legal regulation of those 
with outsized legal power might be an excellent sequel project, though it might 
end up being the case that these issues largely reflect the flip side of many of the 
legal reforms Dailey is advocating. For example, the opposite of being more 
careful about how unconscious forces may lead weaker parties into prenuptial 
agreements that are obviously against their interests is to be less careful, which 
in Dailey’s view ends up privileging the stronger parties, who may want to 
limit their spouse’s access to their assets for all sorts of reasons, both conscious 
and unconscious. It is not clear to me that unpacking the reasons that stronger 
parties use law to disadvantage weaker parties matters that much—unless law 
is willing to do something about this based on a heightened realization that 
weaker parties (in criminal interrogations as in prenuptial agreements) are not 
necessarily acting of their own free will as per the standard myth that Dailey 
wants to dismantle. 
In a similar vein, Dailey examines gestational surrogacy agreements, 
wherein a woman agrees to carry to term for another person or couple a 
baby that is not biologically related to her. Here, too, Dailey points out, the 
surrogate mother may experience a confusing array of ambivalent emotions. 
The relationship between the surrogate mother and baby both is and is not a 
25. Id. at 137. 
26. Id. 
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strictly economic transaction. When the law treats it as nothing more than a 
contract-based commitment, it drastically oversimplifies a far more complex 
situation. A majority of jurisdictions have moved away from interventionist 
approaches to gestational surrogacy agreements, instead treating them as 
commercial contracts in which the parties’ initial expressed intent should 
always prevail. Dailey agrees, for a host of policy reasons, that judges should 
not void such contracts upon their completion.27 But she argues that courts 
should adopt a more hands-on approach prospectively. Such an approach 
might include courts limiting the amount of compensation that can be offered 
for gestational service contracts to expenses incurred, so that women are not 
induced into such contracts for financial reasons, and requiring counseling 
before such arrangements are entered into.28 Dailey acknowledges the problem 
of potentially patronizing women through such protections, but argues that 
the benefits of more restrictive approaches outweigh these drawbacks.29 Her 
argument here bears all the marks of her sensible analysis, fully acknowledging 
the problems inherent in restricting freedom of contract yet concluding on 
balance that some restrictions are the best, though imperfect, policy option.30
Dailey next turns to torts. Her focus here is on the Tarasoff31 doctrine, 
which requires psychiatrists and other therapists to warn specific persons of 
threats to commit violence that patients make against them when psychiatrists 
reasonably should deem such threats to be serious. As Dailey points out, from 
a psychoanalytic perspective the Tarasoff doctrine makes little sense. People 
may seek psychiatric treatment because they have aggressive feelings, yet, 
according to Dailey, a psychiatrist under a reporting duty ends up having to 
give Miranda-like warnings to patients to refrain from talking about “the very 
thing most central in the therapy: murderous rage or blinding self-destructive 
love.”32 Thus, imposing on psychiatrists a duty to warn ends up thwarting 
the very purpose of therapy, as the role of the psychiatrist is to encourage 
patients to examine their most deeply buried, shameful fantasies without fear 
of consequence in the non-fantasy world. Carrying out the duty to warn may 
“destroy the treatment” and leave the patient worse off, feeling abandoned 
and punished as well as grappling with troublesome thoughts without support 
and thus increasing the risk of violence.33 Dailey situates her discussion in the 
extensive literature about Tarasoff, including both legal and other psychological 
work.34 Here, as with other topics she takes on, she seeks to offer synthesis 
27. Id.at 152-53.
28. Id. at 152.
29. See id. at 152-53. 
30. Id. at 150. 
31. See Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
32. DAiley, supra note 1, at 167. 
33. Id. at 168-69. 
34. See id. at 155-76, 256-58 (providing citations to these literatures). 
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and up-to-date psychoanalytic insights on topics that legal commentators have 
been debating for a long time. 
Sometimes Dailey ventures into territory I found challenging, such as in her 
qualified support for the legality of adult sibling incest. Dailey acknowledges 
that parent-offspring incest always raises too much risk of psychological 
coercion to be lawful.35 Likewise, therapist-patient intimate relationships 
should remain off-limits, as supported by research showing harmful effects on 
patients,36 as should sex in other similar authority relationships involving an 
imbalance of power and dependence between the parties.37 Yet Dailey pushes 
forward in examining the argument that, despite the incest taboo, consenting 
adults should be able to choose siblings as sex partners—especially when they 
have not been raised together and no authority relationship exists between 
them.38 Dailey gives a compelling case example in which a court imposed a 
harsh criminal sentence and terminated the parental rights of siblings who 
married after meeting for the first time as adults.39 She does not, however, 
provide much discussion about how one would decide whether there had 
been an authority relationship or some level of coercion between siblings who 
knew each other before their sexual relationship began, and she leaves me 
less than completely convinced of her argument (though of course this could 
spring from my deep-seated psychological aversion to the whole idea of sex 
between family members). Here and elsewhere, Dailey grounds a provocative 
argument in supporting evidence. She succeeds at what she sets out to do, 
which is to raise, rather than definitively resolve, topics that require more 
attention from the judiciary and other policymakers. Again Dailey proves her 
bona fides as a steadfast, courageous, nonemotionally controlled—perhaps 
well-psychoanalyzed?—legal scholar. She goes where the logical implications 
of ideas lead her, even when they bring her to uncomfortable territory. Once 
there, she examines what she finds. 
My favorite chapter addresses children’s rights in the law, an area in which 
she holds considerable expertise.40 Here Dailey argues that children have 
special affirmative rights that adults may not have, including rights to the 
resources that will allow them to develop so that they can later flourish in 
35. Id. at 179, 184, 214 (noting that impact of early childhood attachments typically remains very 
significant in adulthood, thus raising the real possibility that adult incest between parent 
and offspring may not be consensual). 
36. Id. at 188. 
37. Id. at 190, 201. 
38. See id. at 182, 186 (“The adult-incest prohibition thus comes across, upon reflection, as an 
overly broad, morally discriminatory, and unnecessary intrusion on the right of sexual 
autonomy.”).
39. See id. at 179, 185 (discussing Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 810 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
40. Id. at 203. Indeed, Dailey’s faculty page indicates that her two primary areas of academic 
interest are psychoanalysis and the law and children and the law. See Anne C. Dailey Evangeline 
Starr Professor of Law, UConn sChool of lAw, httPs://www.lAw.UConn.eDU/fACUlty/
Profiles/Anne-C-DAiley (last visited March 9, 2019).
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adult life. She labels these rights “transitional rights,” and lists as among these 
the rights to state support, caregiving, relationships with siblings, physical 
and emotional safety, and rehabilitation in the juvenile and criminal justice 
systems.41 Turning the competencies argument on its head, Dailey points 
out that children in many respects have more competencies than adults, such 
as “strikingly well-developed capacities for emotional attachment, fantasy, 
cognitive thinking, relating to others, and psychic change.”42 She then applies 
these observations to the special competencies and needs that children possess—
which are not so much less than as different from adults’—to particular areas 
of legal doctrine. For example, Dailey notes, research on child development 
confirms that children have deep and profoundly important attachments not 
only to their primary caregivers but also to other significant adults who are 
not their parents or primary caretakers. Yet the law gives virtually universal 
rights to parents and primary caregivers and virtually no recognition to the 
value of relationships children have with other adults with significant roles 
in their lives.43 Still another example: The literature demonstrates that some 
forms of punishment of children cause terrible, life-long damage. Yet the law 
largely adopts a hands-off approach to parent disciplinary decisions (at least 
in biologically created families).44 In these and other areas, Dailey argues, 
a psychoanalytic perspective helps encourage more nuanced and tailored 
approaches in children’s law that better take into account the needs and 
interests of children. 
Dailey also attacks the “traditional incapacities framework”45 that governs 
the law of competency with regard to children and others who are not fully 
autonomous in their decision-making. This notion is not completely new, but 
Dailey’s discussion is fresh and engaging, drawing from what researchers have 
learned from the study of the stages in human development. This part of her 
argument is reminiscent of a reform proposal that disability-rights advocates 
have long made46 to the effect that law should not regard competency as an 
on-off switch in which people are either fully competent or lack competency 
to manage their lives at all. In the context of children’s law, full autonomy and 
competence as a human being occurs not all at once, but instead in stages or 
phases. Likewise, Dailey sensibly argues, the law should not contain on-off 
switches by which young persons suddenly obtain full rights on reaching the 
age of majority but possess very few autonomy rights before that magic date. 
41. DAiley, supra note 1, at 205. 
42. Id. at 211. 
43. Id. at 220. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 210. 
46. See, e.g., Robert D. Dinerstein, Esme Grant Grewal, & Jonathan Martinis Emerging International 
Trends and Practices in Guardianship Law for People with Disabilities, 22 ilsA J. int’l & ComP. 
lAw 435 (2016).  
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Part of the reason this chapter is so good is that it is strongly rooted in 
the evidence-based knowledge researchers have about human development, 
especially about such matters as the importance in brain development of 
developing secure early attachments, along with the adverse effects on human 
development of a lack of positive attachments and physical and emotional 
abuse. Children’s brains also have special “neuroplasticity,” as Dailey points 
out.47 
Dailey’s arguments focus on children’s law but have ramifications 
throughout law, as she points out. Thus she calls for focusing on the role of 
law in “constituting rather than controlling citizens” and protecting positive 
entitlements as well as negative freedoms. These positive entitlements include 
rights to maintain important relationships and to receive rehabilitation 
support from the state, since adults, like children, can change. Indeed, as 
Dailey notes, her framework for children’s transitional rights opens inquiry 
into recognition of special rights at other stages of life, such as in old age.48 
Thus Dailey’s long-term humanistic agenda is broader, suggesting that the 
insights of human development research indicate that adult rights, too, should 
encompass “not only a guarantee of negative liberty but some affirmative set of 
entitlements”—a subject she leaves for later work.49 
Dailey’s inquiry into what legal reforms are suggested by empirical work 
on human development takes a somewhat different tack from that of her 
earlier chapters. In this penultimate chapter she relies on evidence-based 
knowledge, whereas in her earlier chapters she focuses more on the theories 
of the psychoanalytic tradition. This shift in focus sets up for the reader the 
question Dailey considers in her concluding chapter, in which she compares 
the psychoanalytic tradition she has been championing throughout the book 
with contemporary trends in psychology that are based in natural science-
based, empirical and/or experimental approaches. This last chapter is less 
fleshed out than her earlier ones, sounding more speculative, as appropriate 
for the end of a work that aims to be ambitious but not to provide a definitive 
treatment of all aspects of a very broad topic. The author is gesturing toward 
future directions she has not conclusively exhausted in the present work. Yet 
this concluding chapter raises important and intriguing questions that require 
consideration in evaluating Dailey’s contribution. I take up these questions 
below. 
47. DAiley, supra note 1, at 217. 
48. Id. at 219.
49. Id. 
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Psychoanalysis in the Humanistic Tradition 
Versus Cognitive Psychology As Science 
In ending her book with a comparison between psychoanalysis and cognitive 
science, Dailey is recognizing, as well she must, a observation with which I 
began this essay—namely, that the topic of the relevance of psychoanalysis to law 
today appears, at least initially, to involve a rather dated question. Dailey does 
not fully spell out the enormous shift in today’s academic climate as compared 
with that of even a decade ago, as that is not the topic of her book, 50 but we 
can consider it for ourselves. In the age of Trump, we academics find ourselves 
struggling to hold onto even the most basic ideas of the Enlightenment, 
especially such notions as the existence of verifiable facts51 and the usefulness 
of the scientific method in producing replicable empirical knowledge. Given 
this climate, the psychoanalytically influenced ideas popular when I first 
started teaching two decades ago, including enthusiasm about continental 
theory, post-structuralism, and Freud-inspired theorists such as Judith Butler 
and others, have largely gone out of vogue. In circles of elite legal thinkers, 
the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky52 has replaced in canonical 
prominence that of Sigmund Freud, just as controlled laboratory experiments 
have taken the place of observations from the psychoanalyst’s chair. Related 
disciplines in the social sciences have moved on as well: The broad qualitative 
observational techniques of classic anthropologists and psychoanalysts have 
been replaced by the tightly controlled, quantitative-measurement research 
styles favored by many of the most highly respected researchers of today. 
Thus a key question Dailey takes on but leaves less than fully answered is this: 
What continued relevance does psychoanalysis have for law in these desperate 
days in the age of Trump, during which law’s foremost concern appears to 
be defending the idea that policy and outcomes can and should be based on 
empirically verifiable knowledge? The comparison between psychoanalysis 
and cognitive science provides a good example of such a paradigm shift that 
can lead us to an assessment of psychoanalysis’s continued usefulness given 
today’s harsh political debate. 
Some fundamental concepts in psychology are shared across both the 
psychoanalytic and cognitive psychology traditions. Most significantly 
50. Of course, Dailey is clearly well-versed in the long and complex history of psychology as a 
discipline (or, stated more accurately, multiple disciplines), but that intellectual history is 
not a central focus of her inquiry, especially after Chapter Two, which deals with the history 
of psychology’s influence on law. See Id. at 38-73.
51. The iconic example is Trump’s claim about the crowd size at this inauguration. See Eric 
Bradner, Conway: Trump White House Offered “Alternative Facts” on Crowd Size, CNN (Jan. 23, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-conway-alternative-facts/index.html 
(reporting on Trump advisor Kellyanne Conway’s use of the term “alternative facts” to 
explain the discrepancy between Trump’s claims and photographic evidence comparing the 
Obama and Trump inaugurations).
52. See, e.g., DAniel kAhnemAn, thinking, fAst AnD slow (2013) (presenting classic findings 
of cognitive psychology based on experiments that Kahneman and Tversky developed 
together). 
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for purposes of this review, both psychoanalysis and natural-science-based 
approaches to human psychology embrace the existence of the unconscious.53 
What is very different between the two disciplinary approaches is what the 
unconscious looks like. Freud’s unconscious is wild, free, creative, active, and 
dynamic.54 A neuroscientist’s unconscious, in contrast, consists of patterns 
in neurons that cause quick, intuitive, nondeliberative associations. Dailey 
describes the cognitive psychologist’s unconscious as “relatively passive,”55 
though this seems to me to reflect the slightly biased view of a partisan. In both 
traditions, the unconscious operates as a powerful force on human behavior. 
In both traditions, unconscious thought is often irrational. In both traditions, 
such thought is not only un- (i.e., not in) consciousness, but is largely inaccessible 
to consciousness. In cognitive psychology, however, this lack of accessibility 
to the conscious mind of the unconscious results not from thoughts being 
repressed, as in the psychoanalyst’s view56; instead, cognitive scientists believe 
that the conscious cannot observe unconscious brain processes because these 
processes occur far too fast for the conscious brain to catch them as experience. 
The brain, for example, processes images in thirteen milliseconds.57 The 
cognitive psychologist’s unconsciousness constructs human experience by 
creating the world the brain perceives through the nonvolitional unconscious 
processes involved in vision, for example.58 The unconscious not only 
deciphers human faces in milliseconds, but also interprets human intent and 
responds reciprocally with appropriate social behavior, among a great many 
other functions, all primarily through rapid, unconscious neural processes.59 
Some unconscious social associations, such as those that equate perceived 
53. For a longer discussion of the differences between Freudian and neuroscience views of the 
unconscious, see Susan Carle, Acting Differently: How Science on the Social Brain Can Inform Anti-
Discrimination Law, 73 U. miAmi l. rev. (2019) (forthcoming). 
54. DAiley, supra note 1, at 231 (describing “an unconscious characterized by movement: 
repression, resistance, conflict, fantasy, motivation, [and] managing passions, aggressions, 
fears, anxieties, guilt, envy, desire, and self-deprecation, among a multitude of other forces”).
55. Id. at 231.
56. See id. (discussing repression as an aspect of the “dynamic unconscious”). 
57. See Anne Trafton, In the Blink of an Eye, mit news (Jan. 16, 2014), http://news.mit.edu/2014/
in-the-blink-of-an-eye-0116. 
58. On the crucial role of the unconscious processes involved in vision in constructing human 
experience, see leonArD mloDinow, sUbliminAl: how yoUr UnConsCioUs minD rUles 
yoUr behAvior (2013). 
59. For a longer discussion, see Carle, supra note 53. Moreover, in a possible critique Dailey does 
not take on, many natural-science-based psychology researchers appear wedded to arguing 
that many of these unconscious social associations the brain makes instantly may be “wired 
into” the brain as the result of evolutionary processes that for thousands of years made it 
generally a good idea, for example, to regard people different from oneself with anxiety. Id. 
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social differences—of a great many types—with potential danger, create the 
phenomenon of implicit bias.60 These nonvolitional and unconscious reactions 
are irrational in a modern world benefiting from occupational differentiation, 
political pluralism, cultural exchange, and global trade. In such an age, when 
human difference offers a huge societal asset, unconscious instinctual distaste 
or anxiety in response to perceptions of human otherness presents a giant 
liability, interfering with the flourishing of society, yet hard to stamp out.61 
The psychoanalyst’s unconscious and that of the cognitive psychologist 
differ in another important way, as well. As Dailey hints in several parts of 
the book, the psychoanalyst’s operating faith includes a belief that human 
functioning can be made more rational by pulling ideas repressed in the 
unconsciousness into conscious awareness. Psychoanalysis, Dailey writes, 
“draws from Enlightenment values” in its hope that an individual can gain 
some control over the “disruptive, unconscious aspects of the psyche” through 
the exercise of “conscious reason and self-reflection.” 62 
In contrast, cognitive psychology does not hold any such belief as an article 
of faith. Instead, researchers in disciplines such as behavioral economics 
and cognitive psychology seek to measure the degree to which irrational 
unconscious processes can be changed through training. That research has 
not shown particularly promising results in attempts to disrupt the working 
of unconscious brain mechanisms.63 Implicit bias, for example, does not seem 
easily dislodged even when brought to subjects’ conscious attention.64 And 
many other aspects of rapid unconscious thinking are completely inaccessible 
to conscious control, as explored in fascinating detail in a popular treatment, 
Subliminal.65 One cannot resist seeing visual images if one’s eyes are open, for 
example. Thus, although Dailey suggests that cognitive glitches are relatively 
easy to fix with self-reflection, my reading of the literature on cognitive biases 
suggests that they are quite difficult to expunge.66 In this respect, cognitive 
neuroscience may present no more rosy a picture of the prospects of liberated 
human rationality than the psychoanalytic tradition does. 
60. See generally Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CAlif. l. rev. 945 (2006) (introducing the science concerning implicit bias 
to a legal audience); Harvard University Project Implicit Overview, https://implicit.harvard.edu/
implicit/education.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) (providing a good description of how 
implicit bias testing works by leading researchers in the field). 
61. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 60. 
62. DAiley, supra note 1, at 23. 
63. kAhnemAn, supra note 52, at 216 (noting the stubbornness of cognitive illusions). 
64. See, e.g., Calvin K. Lai et al., Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences: A Comparative Investigation of 17 
Interventions, 143 J. exPerimentAl PsyChology 1765 (2016) (comparing seventeen studies of 
interventions to lessen implicit bias and finding the majority were completely ineffective and 
the ones that were somewhat effective were only weakly so). 
65. mloDinow, supra note 58. 
66. See, e.g., Lai, supra note 64.
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The question Dailey raises at the end of her book is whether psychoanalysis 
or cognitive psychology present the best guide going forward.67 The short 
answer, not surprisingly, is that both traditions offer something valuable. Neither 
standing alone is as good as both taken together. Cognitive neuroscience and 
related fields help most with the questions these disciplines have been able to 
effectively address, especially because they rely on empirically based, replicable 
research methodologies and thus benefit from the (albeit limited) advantages 
of scientific methodologies. But as Dailey convinced me by the end of her 
book, the psychoanalytic tradition still has much to offer law that cognitive 
science cannot yet—and probably never will be able to—provide. Human 
emotions play a large role in human conduct, as Dailey persuasively argues, 
and science-based approaches cannot explain all such human behavior—as, 
indeed, cognitive neuroscientists are more than willing to acknowledge. For 
example, knowing more about the specific neuronal mechanisms underlying 
human action does not help lawyers and other legal policymakers construct 
convincing narratives about why criminal defendants falsely confess to crimes 
they did not commit. Note, however, that empirical evidence documenting 
that this phenomenon occurs frequently is also important in Dailey’s ability to 
construct her powerful arguments. 
At bottom, the fundamental challenge Dailey confronts in writing her book 
in this particular era, and successfully meets to some substantial degree, is to 
defend convincingly what she defines as the key relevant humanistic insights of 
psychoanalysis in an age of neuroscience. What contributions do psychoanalytic 
insights offer that neuroscience does not? Dailey’s default argument is that 
psychoanalysis offers a humanistic viewpoint, while neuroscience does 
not. This is well and good as far as it goes, but what about when the two 
disciplinary approaches cover the same turf or topics? Which approach should 
prevail then? Dailey acknowledges that some questions are better answered 
by neuroscience approaches: For example, cognitive science explains over-
optimism and other faulty heuristics. 
In the end, I believe Dailey’s best argument is this, though she does not 
put it exactly this way: In important legal policy circles, psychoanalysis offers 
a shared set of cultural beliefs. Indeed, this may essentially be all it really is. 
Dailey promises to, but never really does, present the empirical, data-driven 
case for why psychoanalysis should be understood to capture verifiable 
“truth.” But regardless of whether psychoanalytical concepts are “true,” so to 
speak, they do today in some important circles provide a vocabulary signaling 
a shared set of cultural beliefs. In this way, the psychoanalytic tradition assists 
legal advocates and adjudicators in constructing the compelling stories or 
narratives about how law should be applied: Individuals’ willingness to enter 
into irrational prenuptial agreements shows that they are facing complex 
and powerful emotional pulls that justify closer court scrutiny about such 
contracts; defendants should not be forced to falsely confess through the 
67. DAiley, supra note 1, at 227 (exploring “[t]he relationship of cognitive psychology to 
psychoanalysis”). 
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use of psychological tactics that amount to psychological coercion; children 
should be permitted to visit adults who are significant in their lives, given the 
importance of such bonds to human development.
In sum, Dailey’s version of psychoanalysis illuminates a potentially shared 
fantasy of a kinder, gentler, more understanding and merciful legal system that 
would care more about using legal rules to advance human flourishing. This is 
not the world we live in today, but it is a wonderful reading experience to be 
reminded of these fantasies and the commitments that push us toward their 
realization. 
